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Abstract
This paper presents an application of the state of the art and new trends for risk management
of safety-related control and monitoring systems, currently applied in the industry. These
techniques not only enable to manage safety and reliability issues but they also help in the
control of quality and economic factors affected by the availability and maintenance of the
system. The method includes an unambiguous definition of the system in terms of functions
and a systematic analysis of hazardous situations, undesired events and possible malfunctions.
It also includes the identification and quantification of the risk associated to the system. The
required risk reduction is specified in terms of safety integrity levels. The safety integrity
level results in requirements, preventive measures, possible improvements and
recommendations to assure the satisfactory management of the risk.
21. INTEREST OF USING RISKMANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES
Control and monitoring systems are broadly used in the ST division to help to safeguard equipment,
accelerators, experiments and people’s life. The performance and level of integrity of such systems
shall be maintained over many years of operation, even though those systems will likely face with
changing environments and technologies, maintenance and tests periods. Risk oriented approaches are
well suited to assure the required level of integrity of those systems over their lifecycle.
This paper presents an application of risk oriented approaches for the specification phase of an
alarm monitoring system, the CERN Safety Alarm Monitoring (CSAM) system. The paper describes
the methodology used for this application, it analyses the obtained results, and it concludes with main
benefits, required manpower and applicability of such methods.
Risk oriented approaches are currently used in the industry and summarized in different
standards such as the IEC 61508 (for references on IEC61508 refer to [1], [2], [3]). These techniques
not only enable to manage safety and reliability issues but they also help in the control of quality and
economic factors affected by the availability and maintenance of those system.
A recent study was made to identify the principal causes of failure of control and monitoring
systems. The results showed that failures are mostly caused by unclear specification of the system [2].
2. RISK MANAGEMENT APPLICATION
In view of the complexity and dimensions of the CSAM system, a very simplified version of it will be
analyzed in this paper. Note that the paper does not pretend to be exhaustive, but it provides an
overview of the methodology and its applicability. The detailed analysis can be found in the
references.
For this application, the system under study is the future safety alarm transmission and
supervision system. The CSAM system will help to safeguard a process, which in this case consist of
all CERN premises in the LHC era (experiments, accelerators, etc.) [3]. Concretely, it will help to
safeguard property, equipment, people’s life as well as to maximise physics up time.
To achieve this objective the system shall minimise the consequences of any incident, arising at
CERN premises, by informing as soon as possible the CERN Fire Brigade for an immediate
intervention. Those incidents will be signalled at the Safety Control Room (SCR) by alarms arising
mainly from: smoke (fire) detectors, flammable gas detectors signalling serious leaks, red telephones,
actuation of general emergency stop, oxygen concentration detectors, water leak (flooding) detectors,
actuation of local evacuation signals, blocked lift with trapped occupants and “deadman” devices.
2.1 STEP 1: Unambiguous definition of the system and its environment
The first step on risk management techniques is to define as unambiguous as possible the system
under study, its environments and the service to be provided by the system to the different users [3].
Figure 1: System, environments and functions definition
In the simplified version of the CSAM system (see Figure 1), three environments are identified.
First, the detection equipment (E1), which generates, in case of an incident, the mentioned alarms.
Second, the firemen at the SCR (E2) and third, the local users at the different Local Synoptics (LSs)
(E3) distributed over the CERN, where alarms are displayed.
System
Firemen at the SCR
E2







3Those three environments delimit our system. Indeed, our system goes from the acquisition of
alarms at the interface with the detection equipment, up to the alarm display at the SCR and LSs. Note
that the display includes all process required to present a complete and reliable information to assure
quick firemen interventions.
The service to be provided by system is defined by the interactions between the system and the
environments. Every interaction is called function and it has associated a description (see Table 1) and
an arrow in Figure1. For this application, the system shall provide a complete and correct display at








F1 E1ÿ E2 Display complete and correct information for each incoming alarm at
the SCR to assure a quick Fire Brigade intervention
F2 E1ÿ E3 Display the complete and correct information for each incoming alarm
at the LSs to assure a quick Fire Brigade intervention
2.2 STEP 2: Identification of what is the Tolerable Risk for this application
Next step is the identification and quantification of the risk this system shall protect. In other words
the specification of the risk reduction this system shall provide. Many parameters need be identified
for the risk reduction, being the first one the tolerable risk for this application.
The risk is generally defined as the product of frequency of an accident, multiplied by its
consequences. However, risk is heavily subject to factors very difficult to be quantified, such as
politics, people’s perception, and society characteristics. In particular, the tolerable risk, which is the
accepted risk in a given context, is based on the current values of the society [3]. It is for this reason
that the safety representatives of CERN (TIS Division) were required to identify the tolerable risk for
the CSAM system.
The tolerable risk assignment is made to undesired events (UE) determined “a priori”, by means
of expert judgement of the current alarm system and on the foreseen capabilities of the new one. The
undesired events are events that the users of the system want to avoid. For example, the loss of alarms
or the incorrect display of alarm information (see Table 6). To carry out the assignment, pre-defined





III Tolerable risk if the cost of risk reduction would exceed the improvement gained
IV Negligible risk
Undesired risk, and tolerable only if risk reduction is impractible or if the costs are grossly




Table 2 defines four risk classes. Table 3 defines six frequency categories of any event or
incident. Table 4 presents the consequence categories used to classify the severity of an accident for
the process. They are essentially based on two criteria: injury to personnel and damage to equipment.
Table 4
Consequence categories
Finally a Risk Matrix can be drawn out in order to identify the risk associated with an undesired
event. In this way it becomes possible to decide whether this risk is intolerable, acceptable or
negligible, and if it is necessary to undertake preventive measures or not.
Table 5
Risk Matrix classification of accidents
By means of Table 4 and with the judgement of experts, the consequences for every undesired
event are identified. This refers to the impact that the UE may have on the whole process the system is
protecting. As seen in Table 6, the UE defined for this particular application can have ‘catastrophic’,
‘major’ or ‘severe’ consequences.
Then, the threshold for tolerable risk is determined by means of Table 5. The risk is generally
acceptable if all the efforts have been done to reduce it at the minimum and if any other financial
effort is disproportionate to the improvement gained. Thus the maximum allowable frequency is
determined in order the risk to be classified with the index ‘II’. The meaning of such a frequency is
explained in Table 3.
For example, to make the risk tolerable for a ‘catastrophic’ UE, the frequency of occurrence
shall be lower than ‘remote’. However, given that it is a common use to require that the frequency is at
Frequent Eventswhichareverylikelytooccur in the facilityduring its lifetime >1
Probable Events that are likely tooccur in the facilityduring its lifetime 0.1-1
Occasional Eventswhicharepossibleandexpected tooccur in the facilityduring its lifetime 0.01-0.1
Remote Eventswhicharepossiblebut not expected tooccur inthe facilityduringits lifetime 0.001-0.01
Improbable Eventswhichareunlikely tooccur in the facilityduring the lifetime 0.0001-0.001
Negligible Eventswhichareextremelyunlikely tooccur inthe facilityduringits lifetime <0.0001
Category Description Indicative frequency level(peryear)
Critiria N. fatalities CHF loss Downtime
1 week - 3 months
10 KCHF- 1 MCHF 4 hours - 1 week




1 MCHF - 100 MCHFMajor
Severe
Minor
Events capable of resulting
in a fatality
Event which may lead to
serious, but not fatal, injury
Events which may lead to
minor injuries
Injury to personnel Damage to equipmentCategory
Events capable of resulting
in multiple fatalities >1 > 100 MCHF > 3 monthsCatastrophic
Catastrophic Major Severe Minor
Frequent I I I II
Probable I I II III
Occasional I II III III
Remote II III III IV
Improbable III III IV IV
Negligible IV IV IV IV
Consequence
Frequency
5least one or two orders of magnitude lower than the threshold, the effective Tolerable frequency is
‘negligible’ as indicated between brackets in Table 6.
Table 6
Undesired Events (UE)
Identifier Description Specification Consequences Tolerable
Frequency [y-1]
UE-1 Partial loss of the system at the
SCR (one or more alarms)












The tolerable risk is then specified when Table 6 is completed.
2.3 STEP 3: Determination of Safety Functions
Next step towards the specification of the required risk reduction is the identification of the functions
actively participating to protect the process. In other words, to identify the functions which can lead to
UE in case of malfunctioning. These functions are called safety functions to distinguish them from
normal functions.
For our particular application, both functions in Table 1 shall be considered as safety functions
because they can lead to the UE-1 or UE-2 in case of failure.
2.4 STEP 4: Estimation of Event Likelihood
In the determination of the required risk reduction, the event likelihood is an important factor. In this
case the event likelihood is the probability of occurrence of any real initiating event triggering an
alarm in the mentioned detection equipment. For example, the higher ‘catastrophic’ fire or gas leak
likelihood we have, the more risk reduction is required to maintain a tolerable risk for the process.
To estimate this event likelihood, the event likelihood for LEP period is calculated and then
extrapolated to the LHC era. Considering only fire events for this simplified application, the following
event likelihood were obtained for the LEP period: 5 ‘minor’ fires/year (‘frequent’) (Example: fire in
an electrical rack), 1 ‘severe’ fire/year (‘probable’) (Example: fire in a power converter or a magnet), 2
‘major’ fires/5 years (‘probable’) (Example: fire in BA3) and no ‘catastrophic’ fires (Example:
experiment burned). For the last case, the ‘remote’ frequency is considered instead.
Then, the following conservative hypothesis is made to extrapolate to the LHC era: fire event
likelihood for the LHC are 10 times higher than the expected for the LEP. Therefore, for a ‘minor’
incident for example, the estimated frequency of occurrence is ‘frequent’ (50 Fires/Year).
2.5 STEP 5: Other Safety-Related Systems helping to safeguard the process
Another factor taking part in the determination of the required risk reduction is the total number of
independent safety-related systems helping to safeguard our process.
For the LHC era there will be many different systems. However, not all of them are independent
or protect the same risks. Some systems will help to reduce risk by reducing the frequency of initiating
events. This is the case of detectors and accelerators control systems. Some systems help to reduce
risk by reducing the consequence of initiating event. For example the CSAM system, the Access
controls and Interlock system, extinguishers, smoke removal systems in the tunnels etc.
A detailed analysis of those systems concluded that the combination of all this system together
is equivalent to have two fully independent safety-related systems performing the mentioned safety
functions. In case of ‘catastrophic’ or ‘major’ incidents, a third system is also available.
62.6 STEP 6: Determination of the Required Risk Reduction for this application
The IEC61508 proposes to determine the required risk reduction by identifying the required Safety
Integrity Levels or SIL associated to every safety function and to the whole system (see Table 7) [3].
Table 7
Safety Integrity Levels
There exist four SIL values linked to numerical Target Failure Measure for both low demand
and high demand or continuous mode of operation systems. For a low demand system, a SIL1 means
that a system with 1 chance over 10 of failure is acceptable. For a continuous mode of operation, a
SIL1 means that a system with a probability of a dangerous failure per hour of 10-5 is acceptable.
To determine the SIL of our system, which will provide us the required risk reduction, the
Hazardous Event Severity Matrix is used. This matrix is presented in Figure 2. The SIL is first
determined for every safety function and then extended to the whole system.
Figure 2: CSAM Hazardous Event severity matrix
Let us consider function F1. From step 3 we know that if this function fails it can lead to a
‘severe’ UE like the loss an alarm. We are then in the bottom-right rectangular of Figure 2 (a). From
step 4, we know that the event likelihood for ‘severe’ fires is ‘frequent’ (b). From step 5, we know that
two different safety-related systems are available (c). Therefore, the safety function F1 shall be at least
SIL 2 (d). To determine the SIL of the system the same procedure shall be applied to every safety
function and to every category consequence that the UE can lead to. We would take then the more
conservative SIL number. At this stage we can affirm that the system shall be at least SIL2.
The objective is then achieved. With this method, we are capable of determining the required
risk reduction for our system to have a tolerable risk for the process, given a certain environment of
event likelihood and other safety-related system available.
3. CONCLUSIONS
The methodology described in this paper can be used to specify any other control and monitoring
systems. The same methodology is being used to guide the re-engineering of existing systems [2].
SIL 1 10-1 10-5
SIL 2 10-2 10-6
SIL 3 10-3 10-7
SIL 4 10-4 10-8
High demand or continuous mode of operation
(Probability of a dangerous failure per hour)
Low demand mode of operation
(Average probability of failure to perform






3 - - - SIL1 SIL 1 SIL2 - - SIL 1 SIL1 SIL 2 SIL2
2 SIL 1 SIL 1 SIL 2 SIL 2 SIL 3 SIL3 SIL 1 SIL 2 SIL 2 SIL 3 SIL3 SIL3
1 SIL 2 SIL 3 SIL 3 SIL3 SIL3 SIL 3 SIL 3 SIL 3 SIL 3 SIL3 SIL3 SIL4
Negligible Improbable Remote Occassional Probable Frequent Negligible Improbable Remote Occassional Probable Frequent
Category
Consequences
3 - - - - - SIL 1 - - - - - SIL 1
2 - - - SIL 1 SIL 1 SIL 2 - SIL 1 SIL 1 SIL 2 SIL 2 SIL 2
1 SIL 1 SIL 1 SIL 1 SIL 1 SIL 2 SIL 2 SIL 1 SIL 1 SIL 2 SIL 2 SIL3 SIL 3
Negligible Improbable Remote Occassional Probable Frequent Negligible Improbable Remote Occassional Probable Frequent
Category
Consequences
Event likelihood Event likelihood
MINOR SEVERE






7The main benefit of determining the SIL is that this value defines the required framework to
maintain the specified integrity level over the lifecycle of the system: from the concept to the
dismantling phase. It defines the skills of the people to deal with safety, the different techniques to be
used for the implementation of the system and the procedures to be defined and carried out [2].
Furthermore, once the SIL is determined, the following 4 parameters are fixed as well:
Reliability, Availability, Maintenance and Safety. For example, the acceptance of a SIL 1 means that
the level of hazard or economic risk is sufficiently low and that a system with 10% of chance of failure
(90% availability) is acceptable for low demand systems.
An order of magnitude of the effort required to perform such analysis for a system like CSAM
is between 1-3 man*month.
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